Abstract-We consider the min-cost multicast problem (under network coding) with multiple correlated sources where each terminal wants to losslessly reconstruct all the sources. This can be considered as the network generalization of the classical distributed source coding (Slepian-Wolf) problem. We study the inefficiency brought forth by the selfish behavior of the terminals in this scenario by modeling it as a noncooperative game among the terminals. The solution concept that we adopt for this game is the popular local Nash equilibrium (Waldrop equilibrium) adapted for the scenario with multiple sources. The degradation in performance due to the lack of regulation is measured by the Price of Anarchy (POA), which is defined as the ratio between the cost of the worst possible Waldrop equilibrium and the socially optimum cost. Our main result is that in contrast with the case of independent sources, the presence of source correlations can significantly increase the price of anarchy. Towards establishing this result we make several contributions. We characterize the socially optimal flow and rate allocation in terms of four intuitive conditions. This result is a key technical contribution of this paper and is of independent interest as well. Next, we show that the Waldrop equilibrium is a socially optimal solution for a different set of (related) cost functions. Using this, we construct explicit examples that demonstrate that the POA > 1 and determine neartight upper bounds on the POA as well. The main techniques in our analysis are Lagrangian duality theory and the usage of the supermodularity of conditional entropy. Finally, all the techniques and results in this paper will naturally extend to a large class of network information flow problems where the Slepian-Wolf polytope is replaced by any contra-polymatroid (or more generally polymatroid-like set), leading to a nice class of succinct multi-player games and allow the investigation of other practical and meaningful scenarios beyond network coding as well.
I. INTRODUCTION
In large scale networks such as the Internet, the agents involved in producing and transmitting information often exhibit selfish behavior e.g. if a packet needs to traverse the network of various ISP's, each ISP will behave in a greedy manner and ensure that the packet spends the minimum time on its network. While this minimizes the ISP's cost it may not be the best strategy from a overall network cost perspective. Selfish routing, that deals with the question of network performance under a lack of regulation has been studied extensively (see [7] ) and has developed as an area of intense research activity. However, by and large most of these studies have considered the network traffic injected into the network at various sources to be independent.
From an information theoretic perspective there is no need to consider the sources involved in the transmission to be independent. In this paper we initiate the study of network optimization issues related to the transmission of correlated sources over a network when the agents involved are selfish. In particular, we concentrate on the problem of multicasting correlated sources over a network to different terminals, where each terminal is interested in losslessly reconstructing all the sources. We assume that the network is capable of network coding. Under this scenario, a generalization of the classical Slepian-Wolf theorem [8] of distributed source coding holds for arbitrary networks [3] . In particular when the network performs random linear network coding each terminal can recover the sources under appropriate conditions on the Slepian-Wolf region and the capacity region of the terminals with respect to the sources, thereby allowing distributed source coding over networks. The selfish agents in our set-up are the terminals who pay for the resources. Each terminal aims to minimize her own cost while ensuring that she can satisfy her demands. It is important to note that this is a generalization of the problem of minimum cost selfish multicast of independent sources considered by Bhadra et al. [2] . Due to lack of space we are unable to overview other related work. This can be found in the extended version of the paper [6] .
Our Results: In this work, we model the scenario as a noncooperative game amongst the selfish terminals who request rates from sources and flows over network paths such that their individual cost is minimized (i.e. with no regard for social welfare) while allowing for reconstruction of all the sources. We briefly describe our contributions below. i) Characterization of social-optimality conditions. The problem of computing the socially optimal cost is a convex program. We present a precise characterization of the optimality conditions of this convex program in terms of four intuitive conditions, using Lagrangian duality theory and by judiciously exploiting the super-modularity of conditional entropy. ii) Demonstrating the equivalence of flow-rates at equilibrium with social-optimal solutions for alternative instances. We consider certain meaningful market models that split resource costs amongst the different terminals and show that the flows and rates under the game-theoretic equilibriums are in fact socially optimal solutions for a different set of cost functions. This characterization allows us to quantify the degradation caused by the lack of regulation. The measure of performance degradation due to such loss in regulation that we adopt is the Price of Anarchy (POA), which is defined as the ratio between the cost of the worst possible equilibrium and the socially optimum cost [4] , [7] . iii) Showing that source correlation induces anarchy. The main result of this paper is that the presence of source correlations can significantly increase the POA under reasonable costsplitting mechanisms. This is in stark contrast to the case of multicast with independent sources, where for a large class of cost functions, cost-splitting mechanisms can be designed that ensure that the price of anarchy is one. We construct explicit examples where the POA is greater than one and also obtain an upper bound on the POA which is near tight.
II. THE MODEL
Consider a directed graph G = (S ∪ T ∪ V, E). There is a set of source nodes S that may be correlated and a set of sinks T that are the terminals (i.e. receivers). Each source node observes a discrete memoryless source X i . The Slepian-Wolf region of the sources is assumed to be known and is denoted R SW . For notational simplicity, let N S = |S|, N T = |T |, S = {1, 2, . . . , N S }, and T = {t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t NT }. The set of paths from source s to terminal t is denoted by P s,t . Further, define P t = ∪ s∈S P s,t i.e. the set of all possible paths going to terminal t, and P = ∪ t∈T P t , the set of all possible paths. A flow is an assignment of non-negative reals to each path P ∈ P. The flow on P is denoted f P . A rate is a function R : S × T −→ R + , i.e. the rate requested by the terminal t from the source s is R s,t . We will refer to a flow and rate pair (f, R) as flow-rate. Also, let us denote the rate vector for terminal t by R t and the vector of requested rates at source s by ρ s i.e. R t = (R 1,t , R 2,t , . . . , R N S ,t ) and ρ s = (R s,t1 , R s,t2 , . . . , R s,tN T ).
Associated with each edge e ∈ E is a cost c e , which takes as argument a scalar variable z e that depends on the flows to various terminals passing through e. Similarly, let d s be the cost function corresponding to the source s, which takes as argument a scalar variable y s that depends on the rates that various terminals request from s. These functions c e 's and d s 's are assumed to be convex, positive, differentiable and monotonically increasing. Further, the functions R c e (x)
x dx are also convex, positive, differentiable and monotonically increasing. In particular, these conditions are satisfied by functions like x a , a > 1 and xe bx , b > 0 among others. The network connection we are interested in supporting is one where each terminal can reconstruct all the sources. i.e. we need to jointly allocate rates and flows for each terminal so that it can reconstruct the sources. We now present a formal description of the optimization problem under consideration. 
Min-Cost
where z e , ∀e ∈ E is a function of x e,t1 , x e,t2 , . . . , x e,tN T , that we shall denote z e (x e,t 1 , x e,t 2 , . . . , x e,t N T ) with x e,t = P P ∈P t :e∈P f P ∀e ∈ E, ∀t ∈ T , and y s , ∀s ∈ S is a function of ρ s that we will denote y s (ρ s ).
The formulation above is similar to the one presented in [2] . However since we consider source correlations as well, their formulation is a specific case of our formulation (for a related formulation see [5] ). Since network coding allows the sharing of edges, the penalty at an edge is only the maximum and not the sum i.e. z e is the maximum flow (among the different terminals) across the edge e. Similarly, the penalty at the sources for higher resolution quantization is also driven by the maximum level requested by each terminal i.e. y s is also maximum. In this work, for differentiability requirements the maximum function will be approximated as L p norm with p → ∞. Nevertheless, most of our analysis is done where z e and y s are non-decreasing functions partially differentiable with respect to their arguments, such that c e (z e ) and d s (y s ) are convex, positive, differentiable and monotonically increasing. Note that in the formulation above, the objective function is convex and all constraints are linear which implies that this is a convex optimization problem.
The constraint (1) above models the fact that the total flow from the source s to a terminal t needs to be at least R s,t . Finally, the rate point of each terminal R t needs to be within the Slepian-Wolf polytope. A flow-rate (f, R) satisfying all the conditions in the above optimization problem (i.e. (NIF-CP) ) will be called a feasible flow-rate for the instance (G, c, d, R SW ) and the cost C(f, R) will be referred to as social cost corresponding to this flow-rate. Also, we will call a solution (f * , R * ) of the above problem as an OPT flow-rate for the instance (G, c, d, R SW ).
Consider a feasible flow-rate (f, R) for the above optimization problem. It can be seen that the value of the flow from A ⊆ S to a terminal t ∈ T is P P ∈∪s∈APs,t f P ≥ P s∈A R s,t . Since R t ∈ R SW the result of [3] shows that random linear network coding followed by appropriate decoding at the terminals can recover the sources with high probability. Conversely the result of [1] shows the necessity of the existence of such a flow.
Terminals' Incentives and the Distributed Compression Game: The above formulation for social cost minimization for the instance (G, c, d, R SW ) disregards the fact that the agents who pay for the costs incurred at the edges and the sources may not be cooperative and may have incentives for strategic manipulation. In this work we consider the scenario where the terminals pay for the network resources they are being provided. The terminals are noncooperative and will behave selfishly trying to minimize their own respective costs without regard to the social cost, while ensuring that they can reconstruct all the sources. We have the following assumptions. (i) Let (f, R) denote a feasible flow rate for the instance (G, c, d, R SW ). The network operates via random linear network coding over the subgraph of G induced by the corresponding {z e } for e ∈ E. The terminals are capable of performing appropriate decoding to recover the sources.
(ii) Each terminal t ∈ T can request for any specific set of flows on the paths P ∈ P t and rates R t as long as such a request allows reconstruction of the sources at t. There is a mechanism in the network by means of which this request is accommodated i.e. the subgraph over which random linear network coding is performed is adjusted appropriately.
In this work we wish to characterize flow-rates that represent an equilibrium among selfish terminals while they act strategically to minimize their own costs. Furthermore, we shall systematically study the loss that occurs due to the mismatch between the social goals and terminal's selfish goals.
Towards this end, we now formally model the game originating from the selfish behavior of the terminals. We model this game as a normal formal game, i.e. a static one shot strategic game of complete information, which we refer to as
Distributed Compression Game(DCG).
A normal form game, denoted (N, {A i } i∈N , {º i } i∈N ), consists of the set of players N, the tuple of set of strategies A i for each player i ∈ N, and the tuple of preference relations º i for each player i ∈ N on the set A = × i∈N A i . For a, b ∈ A, a º i b means that the player i prefers the tuple of strategies a to the tuple of strategies b. In the context of Distributed Compression Game, given an instance (G, c, d, R SW ), these parameters are defined as follows.
1) The Distributed Compression Game: Players: N = T , i.e. the terminals are the players. This is because, as mentioned above, the terminals are the users and they are the ones who pay for the network resources they are being provided. Strategies: The strategy set of a player t ∈ T consists of tuples (f t , R t ) where
• f t is the vector of flows on paths going to t, i.e. the vector of values f P for all P ∈ P t , and recall that R t denotes the rate vector for terminal t; • f P ≥ 0 ∀P ∈ P t , P P ∈P s,t f P ≥ R s,t ∀s ∈ S and R t ∈ R SW . Therefore,
Note that a feasible flow-rate (f, R) for the instance (G, c, d, R SW ) is an element of the set A = × t∈T A t defined for the same instance.
Preference Relations: To specify the preference relation of terminal t ∈ T , we need to know how much does she pay given a feasible flow-rate (f, R) i.e. what fractions of the costs at various edges and sources are being paid by t? To this end, we need market models, i.e. mechanisms for splitting the costs among various terminals.
Edge Costs: At a flow f, the cost of an edge e ∈ E is c e (z e ).
It is split among the terminals t ∈ T , each paying a fraction of this cost. Let us say that the fraction paid by the player t is Ψ e,t (x e ) i.e. the player t pays c e (z e )Ψ e,t (x e ) for the edge e where x e denotes the vector (x e,t 1 , x e,t 2 , . . . , x e,t N T ).
Of course, P t∈T Ψ e,t (x e ) = 1 to ensure that the total cost is borne by someone or the other. The total cost borne by t across all the edges is P e∈E c e (z e )Ψ e,t (x e ), denoted C
. Thus, with the edge-cost-splitting mechanism Ψ and the source-cost-splitting mechanism Φ, the total cost incurred by the player t ∈ T at flow-rate (f, R) denoted
Now, each terminal t would like to minimize its own cost i.e. the function C (t) (f, R) and therefore the preference relations {º t } are as follows. For two flow-rates (f, R) ∈ A and (f,R) ∈ A, (f, R) º t (f,R) if and only if
We will call (G, c, d, R SW , Ψ, Φ) as an instance of the Distributed Compression Game.
2) Solution Concepts for the Distributed Compression Game:
We now outline the possible solution concepts in our scenario. These are essentially dictated by the level of sophistication of the terminals. Sophistication refers to the amount of information and computational resources available to a terminal. In this work we shall work with two different solution concepts that we now discuss. a) Nash Equilibrium. The solution concept of Nash equlibrium requires the complete information setting and requires each terminal to compute her best response to any given tuple of strategies of the other players. For notational simplicity, let f −t be the vector of flows on paths not going to terminal t i.e. the vector of values f P for all P ∈ P − P t , therefore f = (f −t , f t ). Similarly, R −t is the vector of rates corresponding to all players other than t, therefore R = (R −t , R t ). In our setting, the best response problem of a terminal t is to minimize her cost function C (t) (f −t , f t , R −t , R t ) over (f t , R t ) ∈ A t given any (f −t , R −t ). Therefore a Nash flowrate is defined as follows.
Definition 1: (Nash flow-rate) A flow-rate (f, R) feasible for the instance (G, c, d, R SW ) is at Nash equilibrium, or is a Nash flow-rate for instance (G, c, d, R SW , Ψ, Φ), if ∀t ∈ T ,
We note that computing the best response will in general require a given terminal to know flow assignments on all possible paths and rate vectors for all the terminals. Moreover, convexity of the objective function in NIF − CP (i.e. social cost C(f, R)) does not imply convexity of C (t) (f −t , f t , R −t , R t ) in the variables (f t , R t ) ∈ A t in general. Therefore the computational requirements at the terminals may be large. Consequently Nash equilibrium does not seem to be an appropriate solution concept for the Distributed Compression Game when we look through the algorithmic lens. b) Waldrop Equilibrium. From a practical standpoint, a terminal may only have partial knowledge of the system and may be computationally constrained. A solution concept more appropriate under such situations is that of local Nash equilibrium or Waldrop equilibrium that is widely adopted in selfish routing and transportation literature [7] . We note that this solution concept has also been utilized in [2] . We first present the precise definition of the Waldrop equilibrium in our case and then provide an intuitive justification. Towards this end, we need to define the marginal cost of a path.
Definition 2: (Marginal Cost of a Path) For a P ∈ P t its marginal cost is C P (f) := P e∈P ce(ze)Ψe,t(xe) xe,t .
Therefore, for the terminal t, the total cost for the edges, C
E , can be equivalently written as C (t) (1) ∀t ∈ T, ∀s ∈ S, we have P P ∈Ps,t f P = R s,t . (2) ∀t ∈ T , we have P s∈S R s,t = H(X S ). (3) ∀t ∈ T, ∀s ∈ S, P, Q ∈ P s,t with f P > 0, C P (f ) ≤ C Q (f ). (4) For t ∈ T , let j ∈ S participates in all tight rate inequalities involving i ∈ S (i.e. if A ⊆ S, such that i ∈ A and P l∈A R l,t = H(X A |X −A ) 1 , then j ∈ A) and let P ∈ P i,t , Q ∈ P j,t with f P > 0 then we have
Intuitively, conditions (1) and (2) require that each terminal requests as little rate and flow as possible. Condition (3) ensures that an infitesimally small change in flow allocations from path P (where f P > 0) to path Q where P, Q ∈ P s,t , will increase the sum cost along paths in P t . Now, consider an infitesimally small change in flow allocation from P ∈ P i,t (where f P > 0) to Q ∈ P j,t . This also requires a corresponding change in the rates requested from sources i and j by terminal t. Under certain constraints on the source j, Condition (4) ensures that the overall effect of this change will serve to increase terminal t's cost. The conditions on the source j are well-motivated in light of the characterization of Nash flow-rate at the end of section III in the case when the best response problem of every terminal is convex. We remark that a Nash flow-rate may not always be a Waldrop flow-rate and vice versa. When sources are independent, condition (2) implies that R s,t = H(X s ) for all s ∈ S, t ∈ T and it is not required to check the condition (4). Also we can recover condition (3) by setting i = j in condition (4). They are stated separately for the sake of clarity.
As we discussed earlier, the solution concept based on Waldrop equilibrium seems more suitable to our scenario and consequently we define the price of anarchy [4] , [7] in terms of Waldrop flow-rate instead of Nash flow-rate.
Definition 4: Price of Anarchy(POA): Let C be a class of edge cost functions, D be a class of source cost functions, G be a class of networks/graphs, Ψ be an edge cost splitting mechanism, Φ be a source cost splitting mechanism, and M be a set of Slepian-Wolf polytopes. We will refer to (G, C, D, Ψ, Φ, M) as a scenario. The price of anarchy for the scenario
where C OP T (G, c, d, R SW ) refers to the optimal cost of NIF − CP for the instance (G, c, d, R SW ). Let us denote the set of Slepian-Wolf polytopes corresponding to the case where there are no source correlations (i.e. H(X A |X −A ) = H(X A ) for all A ∈ S) by M ind (subscript ind denotes -independent) and the set of Slepian-Wolf polytopes corresponding to the case where sources are correlated (i.e. there exists A ⊆ S with H(X A |X −A ) < H(X A )) by M c . Also, we use G all to denote the class of all graphs where every t ∈ T is connected to every s ∈ S, and G dsw (subscript dsw denotes -direct Slepian-Wolf) to denote the class of complete bipartite graphs between the set of sources and the set of terminals. Note that G dsw corresponds to the case where every terminals is directly connected to every source by an edge and no network coding is required.
A question we will be most concerned with in this paper is whether III. CHARACTERIZING THE OPTIMAL FLOWS AND RATES In this section, we investigate the properties of an OPT flow-rate via Lagrangian duality theory. Since the optimization problem (NIF-CP) is convex and the constraints are such that the strong duality holds, the KKT conditions exactly characterize optimality. On further investigation of the KKT conditions we can obtain four necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality.
Theorem 5: A feasible flow-rate (f, R) for the instance (G, c, d, R SW ), which satisfies the following four conditions is an OPT flow-rate for the instance (G, c, d, R SW ) . Also, there is always an OPT flow-rate that satisfies these four conditions. Further, when the edge cost functions c e for all e ∈ E and the source cost functions d s for all s ∈ S are strictly convex, that is when the optimization problem (NIF-CP) is strictly convex, these conditions are also necessary for optimality.
1) ∀t ∈ T, ∀s ∈ S, we have P P ∈Ps,t f P = R s,t . 2) ∀t ∈ T , we have P s∈S R s,t = H(X S ). 3) ∀t ∈ T, ∀s ∈ S, P, Q ∈ P s,t with f P > 0,
e,t (x e ). 4) For t ∈ T , suppose that there exist i, j ∈ S that satisfy the following property. If A ⊆ S, such that i ∈ A and P l∈A R l,t = H(X A |X −A ), then j ∈ A. For such i and j let P ∈ P i,t , Q ∈ P j,t with f P > 0. Then We conclude this section with an important note that whenever the best response problem of each terminal is convex, using an approach essentially similar to the proof of Theorem 5 (see [6] ), it can be shown that the four conditions in the definitions of Waldrop flow-rate but with
characterizes the Nash flow-rate. Further, under similar convexity conditions, we can also show that a Nash flow-rate always exists for the Distributed Compression Game.
IV. WALDROP FLOW-RATE AND THE PRICE OF ANARCHY
In this section, we investigate the inefficiency brought forth by the selfish behavior of terminals. Under some reasonable cost-splitting mechanisms, we will first show that the Waldrop equilibrium is a socially optimal solution for a different set of (related) cost functions. Using this, we will demonstrate that the POA > 1 and determine near-tight upper bounds on the POA as well. We start out with the characterization of Waldrop flow-rate.
Theorem 7: Let z e (x e ) = ¡P t∈T x n e,t
Further, when the edge cost functions c e for all e ∈ E and the source cost functions d s for all s ∈ S are strictly convex, an OPT flow-rate for (G, c, d, R SW ) is also a Waldrop flow-rate for
In contrast with the result of [2] that holds for a single source with the edge cost splitting mechanism used above, from Theorem 7, we can note that for most reasonable cost splitting mechanisms, the POA will not equal one for all monomial edge cost functions. Explicit examples for POA > 1 can be found in the extended version [6] .
It is interesting to note that in the case when sources are independent, in the Waldrop or OPT solutions, the rates requested at various sources will equal their respective lower bounds (i.e. their entropy). Therefore, the cost term corresponding to the sources will be fixed, and one only needs to find flows that minimize the edge costs. In this situation, it is not hard to see that the POA will again equal one for all monomial edge cost functions. i.e. it is the correlation among the sources that is responsible for bringing more anarchy. We formalize this below.
Let C k = {c : c e (x) = a e x k , a e > 0, ∀e ∈ E} be the set of edge cost functions where all edge cost functions are monomial of the same degree k possibly with different coefficients, and C mon = ∪ k≥1 C k . Similarly, D k = {d :
Corollary 8: Correlation Induces Anarchy: Let z e (x e ) = ¡P t∈T x n e,t ¢ 1 n , Ψ e,t (x e ) = Theorem 9: Let z e (x e ) = ¡P t∈T x n e,t ¢ 1 n , Ψ e,t (x e ) = 
